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THE PEOPLE: A PRE-PRIMER FOR CRITICALLY
REEVALUATING REPRESENTATION & COURT
POWER IN THE PRESENT
Marvin L. Astrada*
The American polity is experiencing an array of challenges that some
characterize as constituting an acute crisis of American identity, governance,
and government.1 In particular, questions pertaining to the representative
character and content of the People2 have assumed center stage in politics
and law. What exactly is an American? Who or what are the People? Is
there an authentic, viable American political identity or community? Or do
the deep ruptures and balkanization that seem to pervade law and politics—
ranging from pandemics, national security, impeachment, and the
environment, to issues of an everyday, local nature—indicate a crisis of
legitimacy, cohesion, and national community?3 What exactly is the role of
the U.S. Supreme Court in this milieu? Although there are competing
* M.A., Ph.D., Florida International University; J.D., Rutgers University Law School; M.A.,
C.A.S., Wesleyan University; B.A. University of Connecticut. The author teaches in the
Politics & History Department at New York University Washington D.C. This Article is part
of a larger project that critically explores and appraises the nexus between the People, law,
politics, and representation.
1. See, e.g., E. J. DIONNE JR. ET AL., IS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?: THE MUNK
DEBATES (2018).
2. The “People” as employed in this writing is indicative of an objective signifier that
draws on and perpetuates the notion of a homogenous, unitary signified, as presented, for
example, in the initial U.S. Constitution. The “people” is indicative of a subjective signifier
that reflects the diversity of the actual people(s) incorporated/excluded in positing the People.
See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 14 (2d ed. 2007) (“Focusing on linguistic
signs (such as words) . . . a sign [is defined] as being composed of a ‘signifier’ (signifiant) and
a ‘signified’ (signifié).). “Contemporary commentators tend to describe the signifier as the
form that the sign takes and the signified as the concept to which it refers.” Id. An identity
signifier, for example, is composed of a signifier, for example, Black, Gay, or Latino, and a
signified concept, for example, racial, sexual, or ethnic identity.
3. See Julia Azari, It’s the Institutions, Stupid: The Real Roots of America’s Political
Crisis, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2019-06-11/its-institutions-stupid [https://perma.cc/MV9E-UTUK]; Freedom in the
World 2019: Democracy in Retreat, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat [https://perma.cc/RN25-MYNC]
(last visited April 18, 2020); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, Pelosi Declares Nation
is in a ‘Constitutional Crisis,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/
09/us/politics/pelosi-constitutional-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/4T35-BNQD];
Simon
Tisdall, Opinion, American Democracy Is in Crisis, and Not Just Because of Trump,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/07/
american-democracy-crisis-trump-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/WLB3-UK5Y].
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interpretations of what the People signify, these notions of representation are
deeply contested. Today, who or what the People signify and what is
representation are important questions to revisit.
In light of the foregoing questions, this brief work employs a critical
conceptual approach to frame and examine Court power, and lay groundwork
for (re)assessing its impact on government, governance, and representation.
More specifically, the Court’s ultimate power to interpret and pronounce the
fundamental law4 rests upon a key notion that merits critical analysis, i.e.,
the People. This Article thus analyzes the People as a political, legal, and
ideological process and construct, and examines its impact on law and
democratic society premised on representational politics.
Among other issues, the Court has explicitly tasked itself with maintaining
the integrity of its power and constitutional order through the exercise of
judicial review and supremacy. Review and supremacy have been and
continue to function as key facets of Court power and identity.5 Each plays
a profound role in affecting and effecting the character and content of the
population that resides within the ambit of the Constitution. Review and
supremacy, however, are essentially elitist, anti-democratic modalities
employed to interpret the fundamental law by an elite, unaccountable, lifetenured Court.
Elitism and non-representativeness are thus key
characteristics of Court power.6 The elitist nature of the Court is reflected in
its place in the constitutional order and its character—that is, it is a nondemocratic, life-tenured, unaccountable institution composed of nine people
who constitute a highly discrete and insular institution, and who occupy
positions at the highest echelons of society.7
The Court’s institutional character, identity,8 and interests9 thus play a key
role in the overarching constitutional order and interpretation of the
fundamental law. The Court has claimed, explicitly and implicitly, the power
of review and supremacy to effectuate its authority.10 The Court exercises
and reifies its power by interpreting the fundamental law, creating a corpus
of knowledge that is a lodestar and ballast for maintaining the integrity,
stability, authority, and legitimacy of the constitutional order that underpins
4. “Fundamental law” in this writing refers to interpretation of the U.S Constitution.
5. See Martin Shapiro, The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: The Supreme Court
Speaks, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 77, 84 (1970); Otis H. Stephens, Jr., John Marshall and the
Confluence of Law and Politics, 71 TENN. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2004).
6. See William J. Daniels, The Supreme Court and Its Publics, 37 ALB. L. REV. 632, 656–
57 (1973); P. M. Williams, The Supreme Court and Politics, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 91
(1985).
7. See ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL
PRESSURES 288–89 (1908).
8. See Rogers M. Smith, Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science, 2
PERSP. ON POL. 301, 302(2004).
9. See GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 114 (Hannah D. Kahn trans., 1939).
10. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter
of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999); Larry D. Kramer,
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6–16 (2001).
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the polity.11 In employing review and supremacy, the Court utilizes a basic
concept of its own making, i.e., the People.
The People is a primary mechanism to examine in critically assessing
Court power. On its face, the People seems a straightforward signifier. The
Preamble declares who is enacting this Constitution—the people of ‘the
United States.’ The document is the collective enactment of all U.S.
citizens. The Constitution is ‘owned’ . . . by the people, not by the
government or any branch thereof. We the People are the stewards of the
U.S. Constitution and remain ultimately responsible for its continued
existence and its faithful interpretation.12

Yet upon closer inspection, this is not the case.13 The Court itself has
acknowledged that the People is mostly a term of art employed in select parts
of the Constitution14 and has provided differential interpolations of the
People in its jurisprudence.15

11. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also Larry Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6
CONST. COMMENT. 103 (1989); Raoul Berger, Constitutional Law and the Constitution, 19
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1985); William W. Van Alstyne, The Idea of the Constitution as Hard
Law, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 174 (1987).
12. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Common Interpretation: The
Preamble, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/interpretation/preamble-ic/interps/37 [https://perma.cc/ZPD4-TTEZ]
(last visited April 18, 2020) (emphasis omitted). Yet,
[i]n the Preamble and in the Constitution itself, . . . the term ‘people’ is found only
twice, plus seven times in the amendments; in the Constitution there is no significant
current use of ‘person’ (although five pre-amendment uses may be referred to),
while in the amendments proper there is a maximum use of only six such instances;
and, finally, in the entirety of the Preamble, Constitution, and amendments, the
maximum use of ‘people’ and ‘persons’ is therefore found in 15 instances. For a
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people,’ it seems almost
sacrilegious that our fundamental document contains this term only twice, and only
nine times if the subsequent amendments are added; and even if ‘persons’ is thrown
in, the significant total rises only to a maximum of 15.
Morris D. Forkosch, Who are the “People” in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 644, 649 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States, to
President Washington (Feb. 12, 1791), in MATTHEW ST. CLAIR CLARKE & D. A. HALL,
LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING
THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 86, 88 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) (“The
preamble, if it be operative, is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the constitution is
useless; but that it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which they supposed
would be best fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of
preambles.”).
14. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“‘[T]he people’ seems
to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its uses] sugges[t]
that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”).
15. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (“[T]he people’ . . .
unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”);
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The People, unlike the physical peoples that constitute the American
populace, can be viewed as an act of imagination. As an ideological and
political construct, the People has been operative since before the founding,
and has been employed by elites other than the Court. In Federalist No. 2,
for instance, John Jay’s exposition of the People is used to argue for the
primacy, inevitability, and organic nature of the Union, and a singular
American People:
it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they
should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal
government . . . .
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens
have been constantly directed to that object . . . [that there is] safety and
happiness in union . . . .
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and
who . . . have nobly established general liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other,
and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so
proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and
alien sovereignties.
To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges,
and protection.16

This conception of the People, which Jay argues is the lodestar of the
Constitution, is severely inaccurate and neglects the multifarious
communities and sub-communities of human beings who were not
considered fully human under the law at the time of the founding, such as
women, children, African slaves, and white men without property.17
However, notions of peoplehood are not static; the People has been expanded
by the Court to include previously non-recognized persons as well as nonhuman entities such as corporations.18
The People is thus a complex sociocultural, legal, and political construct
that provides a primary basis for legitimizing the Court’s power. The Court
has provided nuanced and, at times, seemingly contentious or differential

see also Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078–
79 (2013).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 31–33 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
17. See Forkosch, supra note 12, at 662, 711.
18. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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notions of the People in the fundamental law.19 Thus, Justice James Wilson’s
observation and question, i.e., “‘The PEOPLE of the United States’ are the
first personages introduced [in the Preamble]. Who were those people?,”20
are quite relevant to assessing Court power in the present. Indeed, the Court
has ostensibly interpreted the People in a direct manner. The People is the
wellspring of power and the ultimate authority in the constitutional order:
[T]he Constitution itself is in every real sense a law—the lawmakers being
the people themselves, in whom, under our system all political power and
sovereignty primarily resides, and through whom such power and
sovereignty primarily speaks. It is by that law, and not otherwise, that the
legislative, executive, and judicial agencies which it created exercise such
political authority as they have been permitted to possess. The Constitution
speaks for itself in terms so plain that to misunderstand their import is not
rationally possible. ‘We the people of the United States,’ it says, ‘do ordain
and establish this Constitution’ . . . Ordain and establish! These are definite
words of enactment, and, without more would stamp what follows with the
dignity and character of law.21

The Court has also stated that,
[I]n our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and
limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true that there must always be
lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final
decision; and in many cases of mere administration, the responsibility is
purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public
judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those
maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws.22

The Court has been consistent in claiming that, “The Constitution of the
United States was made by and for the protection of the people of the United
19. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
589 (1953) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for an alien seeking admission for the first
time to these states. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders . . .
includ[ing] those protected by the First and Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291
(1904) (“No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect, by summary
methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable
as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land, and unlawfully
remain therein.”).
20. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 463 (1793), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22
(1905) (“Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained
and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive
power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any of its Departments.”).
21. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296 (1936).
22. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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States,”23 and that it “was ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves, for their own government . . . as they supposed
best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote their
interests.”24 Yet, how the Court construes the People in the fundamental law
is independent of the actual physical peoples that are subject to the singular
pronouncements of the Court. Critical analysis thus provides insight into
how the Court constructs the People, and the consequences that has for
representative democratic politics.
Power relies upon discourse and language—a language that has the
consequence of de-emphasizing and re-conceptualizing the “reality” of those
that are the subject of discourse. In the case of Court power, it is interesting
to note its posture toward the Preamble of the Constitution, textually and in
“spirit”:
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people
ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the
source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United
States or on any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be
implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared
objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under
the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can
be exerted to that end by the United States, unless, apart from the Preamble,
it be found in some express delegation of power, or in some power to be
properly implied therefrom. . . .
[A]s observed by Chief Justice Marshall . . . “the spirit of an
instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not less than its
letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.”25

The Court has, in essence, placed itself in the position as supreme
expositor of what constitutes the letter and spirit of the law via its
interpolation of the People. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, for instance, the Court arguably reconfigured the
“reality” of poor women via the interpolation of its previous interpretation of
the abortion right that it “found” in the constitutional text.26
23. League v. De Young, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185, 203 (1851).
24. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); see also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402–03 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 324–25 (1816).
25. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819)).
26. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Arguably,
the Court’s utter disconnectedness with the realities of the majority of the American people is
so stark that it simply cannot understand the basic problems and challenges that so-called
ordinary people face:
[T]he District Court found that for those women who have the fewest financial
resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty
explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting
period will be ‘particularly burdensome.’
These findings are troubling in some respects, but they do not demonstrate that
the waiting period constitutes an undue burden.
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The perspective of the Court and its prerogatives take precedence and
prevail in constitutional law. The Court is privileged to operate in a selfcontained, self-defined textual and linguistic universe.27 As Justice Antonin
Scalia notes, for instance,
what is remarkable about the joint opinion’s fact-intensive analysis [in
Casey] is that it does not result in any measurable clarification of the ‘undue
burden’ standard. Rather the approach of the joint opinion is, for the most
part, simply to highlight certain facts in the record that apparently strike the
three Justices as particularly sufficient in establishing (or refuting) the
existence of an undue burden.28

The Court, as test-maker, controls how terms are defined and the methods of
testing.29 Legal models and reasoning produced by the Court become the
standard to convert the people’s reality into the Court’s interpretation of the
real via the People. The real, the actual, is adjudged and manufactured on
the basis of the Court’s notion of the People. As Arthur Bentley notes,
all depends on the shifting of the activities underlying them.
Fundamentally there is no reason why a thing should be done one way
rather than another, except as we find it in the very activities themselves.
The person accustomed to our marriage laws looks upon them as ‘natural,’
and thinks other nations’ laws are ‘queer’ and needing explanation. Our
own he accepts as though they did not need explanation at all. And yet no
outside test will give one the advantage over the other. The test must be in
the activity itself.30

In all configurations of power, however, there is no objective
“metalanguage . . . that [can] ground political and ethical decisions that will
be taken as the basis of its statements. There is no metalanguage; there are

Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (stating that Congress
lacks the power “to enact statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process
decisions of this Court.”); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (“Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less power in
constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body
able to make needed changes.”).
28. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 991 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 980 (“The
inherently standardless nature of this inquiry invites the district judge to give effect to his
personal preferences about abortion. By finding and relying upon the right facts, he can
invalidate, it would seem, almost any abortion restriction that strikes him as ‘undue’—subject,
of course, to the possibility of being reversed by a court of appeals or Supreme Court that is
as unconstrained in reviewing his decision as he was in making it.”).
29. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“Every analysis in this
area [of the Establishment Clause] must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’” (first citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); then citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
30. BENTLEY, supra note 7, at 293. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278 (Alan Bass
trans., 1978).
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only genres of language, genres of discourse.”31 All “testing, all
confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within
a system.”32 As Jean François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud observe, “no
maker of statements, no utterer, is ever autonomous. On the contrary, an
utterer is always someone who is first of all an addressee . . . he is someone
who, before he is the utterer of a prescription, has been the recipient of a
prescription, and that he is merely a relay; he has also been the object of a
prescription.”33 An essential question that arises, then, when analyzing Court
power in the context of elitism and the legal process is, who exactly are or
what constitutes the People? Herein lies a basis for the legitimacy and
authority of the Court to declare what the fundamental law is.
The People, in whose name the Court interprets the Constitution, can be
viewed as an elitist construct, a signifier and process dominated by discrete
and insular elites, grounded in an interest of sustaining the integrity and
perpetuation of the overarching constitutional system and power of the Court.
In sustaining Court power, Rogers Smith notes, there is an ethical dimension
to consider as well when examining the People:
What kinds of stories inspire people to embrace membership in a particular
political community? . . .
Ethically constitutive stories claim that
membership in a particular people is somehow inherent in who the
members truly are, in ways that are ethically valuable. Most racial,
religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical, and gendered senses of
community membership, among others, are ethically constitutive
accounts.34

John Jay, for instance, provides an ethically constituted imagined People for
public consumption during the founding:
It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high
opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly
entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one
federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and
national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced
that they are cogent and conclusive.

31. JEAN FRANÇOIS LYOTARD & JEAN-LOUP THÉBAUD, JUST GAMING 28 (Wlad Godzich
trans., 1999). As Wittgenstein notes, “If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought
whose possibility ensured its truth. A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be
possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to
compare it with).” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 13 (D.F.
Pears & B. F. McGuiness trans., 1975).
32. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 16 (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright
eds., Denis Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
33. LYOTARD & THÉBAUD , supra note 31, at 31.
34. Smith, supra note 8, at 309.
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Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems
to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great
variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great
latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.35

The Court engages in the same act of imagination, also putting forth
ethically constitutive interpretations of the peoples via the People to create a
nexus betwixt it, the populace, and Constitution.
To begin disaggregating the People, one must examine the context in
which it is posited, and how it frames and constrains the relationship between
people and government. The People is a multidimensional concept. It is the
repository of a formal identity. It is the basis of the Constitution—it
undergirds the ideas, such as rule of law, authority of government, and
legitimate governance, that operationalize government. For the Court,
promoting and protecting public confidence in government is central to
continued faith in the rule of law and the integrity of the constitutional
order.36 Constitutions “are but a special form of law. They are specially
guarded habitual activities of the society, enforcing themselves on all wouldbe variants . . . . In the United States, constitutions have a special technique,
different from statute law, but in subject-matter they overlap at many
points.”37 The state, of which the Court is an integral part, acts in the name
of the People it serves. “People’s beliefs that they owe primary allegiance to
some political memberships, along with the conviction of others that they are
likely to hold such beliefs, have major consequences for how people
understand their political interests, how they act, and how others act toward
them on a range of politically significant matters.”38
When taken as a self-evident concept or construct, the notion of the People
functions as a relatively stable notion that expresses itself through a “General
Will.”39 In the realms of representation and public policy, however, the
People is a highly problematic concept. In the interpretation of the
fundamental law, it is empirically the case that the justices are very far
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 36 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
36. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 20–
46 (2018); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 516–518 (2005).
37. BENTLEY, supra note 7, at 295.
38. Smith, supra note 8, at 304; see also Larry D. Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from
Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 221 (2003).
39. See generally Philip J. Kain, Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty, 7
HIST. PHIL. Q. 315 (1990); Jean Jacques Rousseau, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/ [https://perma.cc/2GDE-2AWT] (last visited April 18,
2020). (“Rousseau argues that in order for the general will to be truly general it must come
from all and apply to all. This thought has both substantive and formal aspects. Formally,
Rousseau argues that the law must be general in application and universal in scope. The law
cannot name particular individuals and it must apply to everyone within the state. Rousseau
believes that this condition will lead citizens, though guided by a consideration of what is in
their own private interest, to favor laws that both secure the common interest impartially and
that are not burdensome and intrusive. For this to be true, however, it has to be the case that
the situation of citizens is substantially similar to one another.”).
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removed from the lives of the American people. Socioeconomically,
culturally, and politically, the justices have very little in common with the
population they ostensibly represent and serve.40
[T]he educated elite of America have a different set of opinions and values
than the rest of the country—not always, but as a rule. The divide between
the educated elite and the rest of the nation, on a wide range of legally
relevant issues, is bigger than that between men and women, and possibly
bigger than divides based on race or religion. . . . [B]y granting the
Judiciary the kind of authority it has to invalidate legislation passed by
elected bodies, [we] give the educated elite a veto over actions that have
been approved politically by the representatives of the American citizenry.
The Judiciary[, some scholars note,] is not unlike the House of Lords.41

From the foregoing perspective, one can begin to observe that the United
States “exists as a sovereign nation with its officially stated Constitution, its
economic and foreign policies, its demarcated, patrolled boundaries.
‘America,’ however, exists as image or idea, as dream or nightmare, as
romance or plague, constructed by discrete individual fantasies, and shaded
by collective paranoias and mythologies.”42 The concept of a General Will
cannot be comprehensibly summarized in the limited space of this Article,
but it is problematic in representation and policy. This is the case because, as
Bosteels notes, there is no People before the act by which a people becomes
the People. The “people are never one or homogenous but many and
internally divided . . . far from constituting a stable identity derived from a
preordained essence that would have been racially, ethnically, linguistically,
culturally, or ontologically definable,” the People serves as a mechanism
“that produces its own subject, while reminding us that without an element
of subjectivation there can be no politics.”43
40. See Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive
Federal Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusivefederal-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/NVU2-UTMA].
41. Michael W. McConnell, What Are the Judiciary’s Politics?, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 455,
458–59 (2018). When the founders articulated the superstructure for an American political
and national community and refer to the People, “they think of it always as legitimately
represented by its ‘natural’ leaders,” whom medieval philosophers and political theorists
designated as “selecti, ephori, and so on.” MOSCA, supra note 9, at 380. “The idea that each
separate individual should have an equal share in the exercise of sovereignty” is a recent
invention. See id. at 381. As Gaetano Mosca noted,
[i]n spite of the gradual adoption of universal suffrage, actual power has remained
partly in the hands of the wealthiest classes, and in larger part still, especially in socalled democratic countries, in the hands of the [upper] middle classes. Those
classes have always had the upper hand in the controlling cliques of political parties
and in electioneering committees, and they have supplied in large part, the reporting
and editorial staffs of the daily press [and] the personnel of the bureaucracies and
army officers.
Id. at 389.
42. Bharati Mukherjee, Beyond Multiculturalism, in MULTI-AMERICA: ESSAYS ON
CULTURAL WARS AND CULTURAL PEACE 454, 454–57 (Ishmael Reed ed., 1998).
43. Bruno Bosteels, Introduction: This People Which Is Not One, in ALAIN BADIOU ET
AL., WHAT IS A PEOPLE? 1, 20 (2016). For an example of subjectivation, see Griswold v.
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The question then becomes a political and ideological one, subject to
critical analysis on how a polity, and the People (or a subsection of it), is
conceptualized in law and politics. The question of who exactly constitutes
the People is one of power and privilege. In Federalist No. 10, Madison
explicitly articulates the elitist foundation for government: governance to
protect the opulent minority (the People) from “the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority”44 (i.e., the people). The minute
subsection of the polity that possesses the ability to define—and associate
itself as a protector of—the People is correlated with elite sociocultural,
political, and economic status.45 Public Policy discourse and its translation
into practice thus reflect the politics that attaches to defining the American
People. In immigration, e.g., the notion of an American People is partially a
product of the Court’s deference to the Executive’s substantial control over
laws governing which types of people qualify to enter and remain in the
United States.46 The notion of the People is thus not necessarily a
representative concept in a democratic sense of the term.47
Court discourse reifies its interpretation of a non-democratically
constituted People in its jurisprudence, espousing the authenticity of the
People via a normative association of its interpretation with an objective
referent, i.e., the People rather than the people.48 The philosopher Alain
Badiou defines the notion of a People as “in reality mean[ing] nothing more
than ‘the inert mass of those upon whom the state has conferred the right to
call themselves’” members of a nation.49 Legitimizing the normative
association for a subset of the polity to be or have the power to define the
People is partially effectuated by identification of what type of person or
group is the basis of the interests of the elite at the upper echelon of power.

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.”) .
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
45. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 137 (2013).
46. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (stating
that “exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty” and that “[t]he right to do so
stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation.”). The courts, before and after Knauff, have been deferential to
the executive in the realms of national security and immigration, partially based on
Congressional delegation of its immigration power to the executive. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,
the Court stated that, within the immigration context, the courts should not “look behind the
exercise of [executive] discretion” when it is exercised “on the basis of a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason.” 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”); Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
47. See Ortiz M. Walton, Toward a Non-racial, Non-ethnic Society, in MULTI-AMERICA:
ESSAYS ON CULTURAL WARS AND CULTURAL PEACE, supra note 42, at 451, 452.
48. John Agnew, Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity,
and Movement in World Politics, 28 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 499, 499–521 (1999).
49. Alain Badiou, Twenty-Four Notes on the Uses of the Word “People,” in WHAT IS A
PEOPLE?, supra note 43, at 21, 23–24.
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The Court assumes this role for the judicial branch. This is why the Court
was able to state, in the case of abortion, that
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in
such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected
in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that
the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present
whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.50

The will of the People is an essential aspect of the legitimate exercise of
power to declare a singular interpretation of the fundamental law. In
expressing the character and content of the people through the People, “the
people [the Court] claims as its authority . . . becomes a passive mass that [it]
configures, universally.”51 The polity is fractured into distinct communities
and identities, while certain minute subsets of the whole have the privilege
of identifying the People, simultaneously defining Inside/Outside,
People/Other, despite the fractured nature of the peoples in actuality.52 The
People thus function as the bedrock of justification for the State to act on
behalf of People. The Court is government, and government is the State. The
legitimized expression of the General Will through the electoral system, on
all levels of government, still does not reconcile this internal constitutive
exclusionary process, in that
it is never really the case that all of the possible people who are represented
by ‘the people’ show up to claim they are the people! So ‘we, the people’
always has its constitutive outside . . . . It is this surely not the fact that the
‘we’ fairly and fully represents all the people; it cannot, even though it can
strive for more inclusive aims.53

Representation, substantively, is ablated in the exercise of Court power.
The Court is able to pronounce judgment on every facet of a subject’s legal
position as the final word on the fundamental law, where one either views
the outcome as “good” or “bad.”54
The People, then, in a democratic society, is not a homogenizing concept
by which distilling a general will takes place, but rather “a set of debates

50. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992)
(emphasis added).
51. Badiou, supra note 49, at 25–26.
52. See Duncan S. A. Bell, Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity, 54
BRIT. J. SOC. 63, 64 (2003).
53. Judith Butler, “We, the People”: Thoughts on Freedom of Assembly, in WHAT IS A
PEOPLE?, supra note 43, at 49, 51.
54. Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (holding that, under the Fifth
Amendment, African slaves were property, and law that deprives a slave owner of property
without due process is unconstitutional), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding
that “separate but equal” accommodations based on race do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that laws establishing
racial segregation in public schools are unconstitutional).
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about who the people are and what they want.”55 This dimension is absent
in Court discourse regarding the People in the larger democratic process and
political system. When an unaccountable elite hold plenary or a
preponderance of power, influence, and control over public policy, the
process of democratic representation is stretched thin considering that,
[t]he people who are the ‘we’ do something other than represent
themselves; they constitute themselves as the people, and this act of selfmaking or self-constitution is not the same as any form of
representation . . . . This act of self-designating and self-constituting forms
as assembly that articulates itself as the ‘people.’ Popular sovereignty is
thus a form of reflexive self-making that is separate from the very
representative regime it legitimates.56

In the administration of justice, then, the Court cannot “concern itself with
correcting every injustice . . . . [It must always] consider the big picture.”57
The Court tends to cast the polity as a passive, singular-willed body of
citizens with homogenous interests. This is the opposite of a “we the people”
that “does not describe that plurality but seeks to bring about the social
plurality that speaks it.”58 The Court’s discourse is the bedrock of its power;
perceptions of its legitimacy hinge on the integrity of the textual
interpretations of the fundamental law proffered for public consumption.
“[L]anguage implies a specific metaphysics of life. The interpretation
defines our relations to . . . other human beings and to the self.”59 To
effectively perpetuate review and supremacy, Court power selectively
formalizes the expression of the People’s will. This is an inherently political
and ideological process. “Many of the Court decisions, perhaps all of them,
[have] political repercussions of one kind or another.”60 Thus, the question
of who are the People “is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never
a self-fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image of identity
and the transformation of the subject assuming the image.”61 Thus, the Court
transforms the American population into the People when it expresses the
latter’s will.

55. Butler, supra note 53, at 53. See generally James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?,
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (2015).
56. Butler, supra note 53, at 51–52. See generally MORGAN MARIETTA, A CITIZEN’S
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (2014).
57. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 36, at 272. The quote refers to the case of
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
58. Butler, supra note 53, at 52; see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1962).
59. Jeff Huysmans, Security! What Do You Mean?: From Concept to Thick Signifier,4
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 226, 231 (1998).
60. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 36, at 418.
61. HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 64 (1994).
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The question of who is the People remains a political and ideological one,
rooted in power. Take, for example, the case of Warth v. Seldin,62 in which
the Court reiterated and upheld
limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts’ decisional and
remedial powers . . . when the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that
harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction[, and] even
when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or
controversy’ requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Without such
limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of
judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions
and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights.63

Justice Potter Stewart expounded upon Warth’s reasoning, concluding that,
“the case called for a value judgment, not a legal one. The challengers were
asking the courts ultimately to rule on economic differences that kept lowincome minorities from living near affluent whites. ‘What they are really
asking us to do is overrule the capitalist system,’ Stewart said.”64
Warth is an exemplar of how the People, its will, and fundamental rights
take on a highly specific, restricted, and select interpretation. Sociocultural
and economic stratification are a norm, a natural trait of the People. Justice
Lewis Powell noted that, “poor minorities were the victims, not of zoning
law, but of the economics of the housing market, something the courts could
do nothing about.”65 Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s ruling, it is
a vivid instance of the immense power to mold the people and shape its
contours by positing the People in its jurisprudence.

62. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
63. Id. at 499–500.
64. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 36, at 444.
65. Id. Justice William Brenan, on the other hand, noted that, for “the poor to sue, they
had to be rich . . . it was the ordinance being challenged—not neutral economic factors—that
insured that the housing market would never change.” Id. at 445.

